The Constellation-class program failed because rather than simply building the ships as designed in Europe, American naval engineers effectively tore up the blueprints and designed a new ship. The U.S. Navy has different mission requirements than its European counterparts, so the ship’s design did need some modifications. Officials sold the idea of the Constellation-class program in part by saying the American version would have 85% commonality with the European version. They then lengthened the hull by nearly 24 feet, redesigned the bow, completely redesigned the ship’s superstructure, and added approximately 500 tons of displacement. The American design today has only 15% commonality with the original.

Navy officials compounded all those problems by committing one of the major deadly acquisition sins: starting production before completing the design. The practice of concurrency, the official term for the overlap of development and production, has been described by one former Pentagon acquisition chief as “malpractice.” Building a ship, tank, or aircraft before the constituent technology has been proven through testing all but guarantees the program will go over budget and fall behind schedule, yet it happens all the time.

Is this normal for military procurement?